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Efficient response to maritime incidents and accidents requires good communication processes and sit-
uation awareness by all involved parties, in particular between the Search and Rescue (SAR) response
operators and the crew of the distressed vessel. In this paper, a method is proposed for enhancing the
communication between the involved parties, by focusing on the safety status of the vessel. Borrowing
ideas from well-established working methods in especially emergency medicine, the Vessel TRIAGE
method has been established through a broad stakeholder consultation process. Its intended application
is to assess and communicate whether a vessel can provide a safe environment for the people onboard.
Using a set of threat factors and a four-level ship safety categorization, the method aims to establish a
shared understanding of the nature of the distress situation, which in turn has implications for the oper-
ational focus of the SAR operators and vessel crew. An evaluation of the proposed method indicates a pos-
itive reception among various maritime stakeholders, suggesting that implementing the Vessel TRIAGE
method in maritime SAR procedures may act as a useful tool to assist in the management of maritime
distress situations.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction support the need for efficient response to maritime incidents andMaritime accidents are rare occurrences with the potential to
result in significant human casualty. Various studies have
addressed maritime accidents, presenting statistical analyses in
certain maritime areas (Aydogdu, 2014; Kujala et al., 2009; Kum
and Sahin, 2015; Qu et al., 2012; Valdez Banda et al., 2015) or of
specific vessel types (Mullai and Paulsson, 2011; Papanikolaou
et al., 2014; Sonninen and Goerlandt, 2015; Wang et al., 2005;
Yip et al., 2015). Research by Weng and Yang (2015) indicates that
fatalities are highest for collisions, fires/explosions, contacts,
groundings and sinking accidents, with contextual factors such as
weather conditions and the sea area where the accident occurs also
significantly affecting the fatality rates.
Apart from highlighting the need for research on and opera-
tional improvements for preventing accidents, these studiesaccidents. Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) services exist to assist
people in distress or danger at sea, and involves activities such as
assisting ships and vessels in difficulty, accident prevention, search
and rescue, medical consultations and patient transport. Maritime
SAR has a legal basis in multi-lateral conventions and documents,
notably the International Convention on Maritime Search and
Rescue (as amended) (UN, 1979), the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS, as amended) (IMO, 1974) and
the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
Manual (IAMSAR, as amended) (ICAO and IMO, 2013). In addition,
national authorities implement bi-lateral agreements and national
acts and decrees.
Some research on operational aspects of maritime SAR has been
presented. Abi-Zeid and Frost (2005) developed a decision support
system for optimal planning of rescue operations. Breivik and Allen
(2008) developed an operational SAR support model, which
accounts for uncertainties in drift trajectories through ensemble
techniques. Baldauf et al. (2011) proposed a concept for
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enhance maritime emergency response. Steigenberger et al.
(2015) presented results of an international study on decision
making in maritime SAR according to situation’s complexity and
other influencing factors.
One area where improvements are considered necessary by
especially SAR operators is the communication and information
exchange between vessel crew, SAR operators and other relevant
parties in maritime distress situations. Several maritime accidents
tragically demonstrate that an accurate assessment of the situation
as well as timely and right decisions both aboard the emergency
vessel and by the Search and Rescue (SAR) authorities are of para-
mount importance when attempting to save the people aboard and
for ensuring the safety of the vessel itself. Accidents where inade-
quate information and communication about the vessel’s condition
have been identified as factors needing improvement are for
instance the flooding and foundering of the Abigail H (MAIB,
2009), the grounding and capsizing of the Costa Concordia (MIT,
2013) and the grounding and flooding of the Commodore Clipper
(MAIB, 2015). The importance of shared situational awareness
and the quality of information in emergency situations is also
stressed by Luokkala and Virrantaus (2014) and Seppänen and
Virrantaus (2015), who highlight the importance of narratives in
information sharing.
According to the expert knowledge from SAR operators, there
are currently no methods or classification systems available for
assessing the level of safety aboard a vessel in distress. The emer-
gency phase classification, based on the SAR Convention (IAMSAR
Vol.II, Section 3.3.1), describes the urgency of response and the
reliability of the information by dividing emergencies in uncer-
tainty, alert and distress phases, but does not convey the status
of the ship itself. E.g. a man-over-board situation and an out-of-
control fire on board a vessel would both be classified as distress
phases, although they are entirely different in terms of how safe
people are aboard the vessel and what kind of response is required
from maritime emergency responders. Another existing develop-
ment is the Local Incident Coordinator tool, which is a method used
to transfer knowledge, know-how and resources to the vessel in
distress (Lübcke, 2015). While this method has its merits, one
important drawback is that it requires skilled SAR personnel on
the scene to use it. For specific accident types such as flooding, a
Damage Control Plan and a Damage Control Booklet is onboard a
vessel as required in SOLAS (IMO, 1974), Chapter II.1 Reg. 23, and
may assist in defining the vessel condition. Some prototype
computations-based decision support systems exist for flooding
accidents (Jasionowski, 2010), but these are not yet widely used
in the industry.
However, there is a lack of an easy-to-use and generic method
to assess and communicate the safety status of vessels in distress
situations, which covers combinations of accidental scenarios and
which can be linked with operational response categories of the
SAR providers. A simple but informative way to communicate this
would also benefit communication between e.g. vessel crew, the
shipping company, salvage companies and classification societies.
In response to this, the purpose of this paper is to present the
Vessel TRIAGE method. This novel method facilitates operative
decision making by offering a simple tool to assess and communi-
cate the safety status of vessels in maritime distress situations. The
basic rationale is to categorize a given vessel in one of four safety
levels, which correspond to a specific operational focus for ship
crew and SAR responders. The idea of a categorization of safety
levels for vessels is adopted from the emergency medicine applica-
tion area, where triage systems are widely applied to quickly cate-
gorize patients in different severity categories (Culley et al., 2014;
Scrofine and Fitzsimons, 2014). Such systems have also been
applied to categorizing patients in maritime disasters (Ryu et al.,2010). The proposed method differs from these systems by focus-
ing on the safety status of the vessel, i.e. on whether a vessel can
provide a safe environment for the people onboard. Due to the sim-
ilarities to triage systems in emergency medicine, the developed
method is named ‘‘Vessel TRIAGE”.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
outlines the method development process. Section 3 describes
the proposed method and how it is intended to be applied in prac-
tice. Section 4 shows the results of an evaluation of the method.
Section 5 provides a discussion. Section 6 concludes.2. Development process
A central feature of the development of the Vessel TRIAGE
method was the cooperation between multiple stakeholders.
Fig. 1 shows the types of organizations which were represented
throughout the method development process.
The development process was coordinated by Finnish maritime
SAR organizations and maritime authorities, which, together with
shipping companies, provided the main maritime field expertise
in the method development. Analytical and conceptual expertise
was provided by a research institute, which was also the main con-
tributor in the documentation of the method and its manual (Raja
et al., 2015).
These core actors together defined the purpose of the method,
made proposals for defining the categories of vessel safety, facili-
tated stakeholder workshops, analyzed and summarized informa-
tion gathered from these workshops, communicated the work in
progress at relevant events, finalized the proposed method, admin-
istered its evaluation and reported all steps as necessary.
In addition, a broad stakeholder network provided input and
feedback at various stages of the project development, as seen in
Fig. 2. These included representatives of classification societies,
pilotages, volunteer/other rescue organizations, maritime industry,
maritime schools, universities and research institutes. In total,
about 40 organizations have contributed to the method develop-
ment. Participants from one university, a maritime software com-
pany and an additional SAR Service have provided specific field,
analytical and conceptual expertise, assisting the core actors in
making proposals for the method’s conceptual structure and con-
tent, theorizing and operationalizing its evaluation, and imple-
menting the method in further technological developments.
While the method is developed primarily by Finnish partici-
pants, the wider international stakeholder platform provided a
forum for input and reflection, with representatives of ca. 15 coun-
tries sharing expertise at various stages. The organization types
and their geographical locations are summarized in Table 1. The
selection of contributors was based primarily on the area where
the method originated and the need to have the main relevant
stakeholders included. Hence, mainly maritime SAR authorities
and shipping companies in the Baltic Sea area were included, as
these are the primary end users of the method. In addition, the rel-
evant major international parties working in the field of SAR or
maritime safety generally were included, in particular the Interna-
tional Maritime Rescue Federation, the U.S. Coast Guard and inter-
national experts on technical ship safety, namely selected class
societies. This was considered important given the ultimate aim
to take the method to the relevant international authorities for
considering it for possible incorporation in the IAMSAR Manual.
Finally, as the method would benefit other areas in the world it
was decided that participation in the development should not be
limited in any way, as long as organizations were willing and able
to commit resources, and agreed to the working process and the
time schedule. The international participation from SAR authori-
ties, universities, research institutes and maritime schools was
Fig. 1. Core contributors (dark gray) and broader stakeholder network (light gray)
in Vessel TRIAGE development.
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expertise (either theoretical or practical) in maritime risk and
safety management.
The method’s development process is illustrated in Fig. 2, where
an indication is given of the time schedule adhered to in the devel-
opment. Four phases are distinguished, which are outlined next.
Phase I. The core contributors outlined the purpose of the
method, and draft the definition of the Vessel TRIAGE categories
and the operational focus corresponding to each level. These are
presented in Section 3.2. Relevant partners were contacted and a
broad stakeholder network was established. Preparations were
made for kick-off seminar and workshop.
Phase II. A kick-off seminar and workshop was organized.
Representatives of several stakeholders provided perspectives on
the needs for improvement on emergency communication in
maritime distress situations. Furthermore, a workshop wasFig. 2. Four phases of the Vessel TRIAGE method developmen
Table 1
Contributing organizations: types and geographical location.
ATG CRI DEU DNK EST FIN FRA GBR
Maritime SAR 1 1 1 1 1 1 – –
Maritime authority – – – – – 2 – –
Shipping company – – – – 2 7 – –
Classification society – – – – – – 1 1
Pilotage – – – – – 1 – –
Volunteer/other rescue – – – – – 3 – –
Industry – – – – – 2 – –
Maritime school – – – – – 1 – –
University – – 1 – – 1 – –
Research Institute – – – – – 3 – –
Total 1 1 2 1 3 21 1 1
Note: Country abbreviations according to ISO (2015).organized with ca. 50 participants where four working groups dis-
cussed the draft Vessel TRIAGE categories defined in Phase I. Ideas
and perspectives were collected about user requirements for the
method, and possible approaches for constructing themethodwere
identified. Suggested methods included e.g. flowcharts and factor-
based scoring systems. Concerning user requirements, it was
stressed that the method should be as simple as possible, and that
it should act as a guide which is flexible to actually occurring situ-
ations. The first requirement stems from the fact that it is intended
to be used in distress situations, and should add as little as possible
additional cognitive burden on the various actors. Simplicity is also
beneficial as it limits the need for training, and the use of simple
pen-and-pencil tools for emergency decision making has been
found beneficial in various studies (Goldstein and Gigerenzer,
1999; Klein, 1995; Shanteau, 1992a). The need for flexibility of
the tool stems from the experience that actually occurring situa-
tions can be very diverse in nature, depending on ship types, partic-
ular design features and so on. Thus, another user requirement was
to keep the method at a high enough level of generality. This way,
the method should guide an assessor to make an informed judg-
ment rather than rigidly calculating or declaring the situation to
be of a definite severity.
Phase III. After processing the results of the first workshop, the
core contributors organized another workshop to elicit criteria
for determining the vessel safety level. These were combined in a
threat factor matrix which is used to assess the Vessel TRIAGE cat-
egory, and a tool to facilitate practical application of the method
was developed. The developed method was presented to and dis-
cussed with representatives of overseas stakeholder organizations
in a webinar, attended by ca. 30 participants. Comments arising in
this webinar and from an ensuing online survey were taken into
account and the method refined. Synergies with other develop-
ments in stakeholder business areas were identified.
Phase IV. In the final phase, a publication event was organized.
Here, core contributors and various stakeholders who actively par-
ticipated during the previous phases presented the method and itst (M: month since start of method development process).
LVA NOR NZL POL RUS SWE USA International Total
1 – – 1 – 1 1 2 12
– – – – – – – – 2
– – – – – – – – 9
– 1 – – – – – – 3
– – – – – – – – 1
– – 1 – – – – – 4
– – – – – – – – 2
– – – – 1 – – – 2
– – – – – 1 – – 3
– – – – – – – – 3
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 41
120 J. Nordström et al. / Safety Science 85 (2016) 117–129implications to practice. For instance, several shipping companies
pledged to continue working together with SAR responders and
authorities in implementing the method in their emergency
response procedures. Maritime industry representatives presented
technical developments which are streamlined with the Vessel
TRIAGE categorization. Finally, a method evaluation questionnaire
was sent out to the stakeholders to assess the degree of support for
the tool.3. Proposed Vessel TRIAGE method
3.1. Aims and scope
The intended use of the Vessel TRIAGE method is to assess the
vessel’s safety status, i.e. to understand to which degree the vessel
can provide a safe environment for the people onboard. Hence,
while the method is applied only after a maritime distress situation
has occurred, it aims to prevent the situation to deteriorate by
improving the communication between various actors. The users
of the method are both the SAR operators in the rescue coordina-
tion centers, and the crew members onboard the vessels. The crew
may use the method to facilitate communication onboard if the
communication can be well managed onboard, subsequently com-
municating the Vessel TRIAGE category to the SAR operators. In sit-
uations where the crew is not able to take lead in the situation
assessment, the method can be used by the SAR operators to guide
the communication process and make a clearly defined situational
assessment. The information related to the categorization level can
be relayed to other stakeholders such as the company of the dis-
tressed vessel, port authorities and salvage companies.
The method is intended to be used alongside (i.e. not as a
replacement of) the maritime emergency phase classification
(uncertainty, alert and distress) in IAMSAR Vol.II, Section 3.3.1,
which largely describes the urgency of the response and the relia-
bility of the information on which the emergency response is based
(ICAO and IMO, 2013). Also, the Vessel TRIAGE method is not
intended to replace existing accident management procedures
used by vessels and SAR authorities. Rather, it intends to supple-
ment these by introducing a new dimension to accident
management.
The method is primarily a tool to enhance communication and
to improve situational awareness by providing color-coded cate-
gories and verbal descriptions of the vessel safety status. The
method acts as a support to structure a discursive situational
assessment and ensuing decision making, which is an acceptable
use of non-predictive models (Hodges, 1991).
The method’s scope of application is in maritime incidents and
accidents such as black-outs, fires or groundings in which a certain
harm has occurred to the vessel. Situations where no harm has
occurred to the vessel are outside the application scope. Examples
of these are mass passenger illnesses due to food poisoning and
environmental damage due to non-vessel damage related oil leaks.
The method may be applied in security related situations (e.g.
bomb threats or ship hijackings), but only in cases where the safety
status of the vessel as such is affected (e.g. if a bomb explodes or if
safety critical devices onboard are manipulated). In case multiple
vessels are harmed in a maritime distress situation, the Vessel
TRIAGE method is used for each one separately. Full details about
the proposed method, as well as an example application, can be
found in the manual referred to earlier (Raja et al., 2015).1 For interpretation of color in Figs. 3–5 and 9, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.
2 Referring to the scope definition in Section 3.1, vessels under normal operating
conditions which have not suffered an incident or accident should not be described
using the green (or any other) category.3.2. Vessel TRIAGE categories and operational focuses
The Vessel TRIAGE method provides an understanding of the
vessel’s safety status, which is expressed in terms of a VesselTRIAGE category. The category indicates the safety for persons
onboard a vessel, accounting for the prevailing and anticipated
conditions on the vessel and its environment. Fig. 3 shows the four
categories and their definitions, along with a description of the
general situation onboard. Black represents the most unsafe condi-
tions, where the vessel no longer provides any safety for the people
onboard. Green1 represents situations in which the vessel safety is
least compromised.2
Arguably, the most significant difference in the vessel’s safety
status is between the yellow and red categories. In the former, it
is still safe for people to remain onboard the vessel. In the latter,
their safety is severely threatened, either immediately or in the
foreseeable future. This is stressed in their definitions: ‘‘there is a
risk that the situation will get worse” (yellow) and ‘‘level of safety
has significantly worsened or will worsen” (red).
Closely linked with the Vessel TRIAGE categories of Fig. 3, the
method includes general descriptions of operational focuses for
each category. These are shown in Fig. 4, and describe what kind
of measures the vessel and maritime responders typically need
to take to manage the respective situations. These operational
focuses are informative in nature, and guide the type of actions
to be taken once the Vessel TRIAGE category has been determined.
In other words, the descriptions in Fig. 4 are not used to determine
the appropriate category, but they are presented here because they
show another perspective on the differences between the
categories.
From this operational perspective, the green category differs
from the others in that damage control measures are either not
required or have been completed. In case injured people are
onboard, these can be evacuated.
In the yellow category, the operational focus is on damage con-
trol measures and stabilizing the situation. Both the vessel’s crew
as well as external responders can participate in this. If the success
of damage control measures is uncertain, evacuation must be
started or preparations must be made to do so. As in the green cat-
egory, evacuation of injured people may be performed even if the
situation does not escalate.
The red category signifies an operational focus on evacuating/
abandoning the vessel, as the vessel no longer provide sufficient
safety to the people onboard. In certain cases, emergency towing
to shallows could be an alternative to evacuation, or at least as a
means of gaining time for actual evacuation.
In the black category, the operational focus is on rescuing peo-
ple on the hull and those in the water, as the vessel no longer pro-
vides any safety or has been lost completely. In addition, when the
vessel category is black, the rule is that SAR personnel is no longer
sent into the vessel.3.3. Vessel TRIAGE threat factor matrix
Based on the user requirements agreed on during the method
development process (especially phase II as described in Section 2),
the method is intentionally simple. From the available method-
ological options determined in phase II, it was decided to develop
a threat factor matrix. This matrix lists possible threats to the ves-
sel’s safety, and includes flooding, listing/decrease of stability,
decreased maneuverability, black-out, fire/explosion and danger
posed by hazardous substances. These threats were defined based
on joined expertise of the various stakeholders listed in Table 1,
and have a close link with the ship main’s safety functions which
Fig. 3. Vessel TRIAGE categories: definitions and description of general situation.
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e.g. (DNV, 2015).
The threat factor matrix, shown in Fig. 5, provides either three
or four descriptions of different degrees of threat factor severity.
For instance, black-out cannot by itself lead to the worst ship safety
level (black category). In contrast, stability can be decreased to
such an extent that evacuation operations are no longer possible
or that the ship has capsized or sunk.
In Fig. 5, the color-coded columns correspond to the Vessel
TRIAGE categories of Fig. 3. The descriptions provided in each cell
are indicative of the severity level of each threat factor. That is,
these are not intended to cover all possible situations which mightoccur in actual maritime distress situations. This simplicity and
brevity is intentional: providing more exhaustive situational
descriptions would make the method more complex and hence
more difficult and time-consuming to apply in practical settings.
In making a judgment about the severity level for relevant
threat factors in a particular situation, the user should use all avail-
able information at the time, and use the descriptions in the threat
factor matrix creatively. SAR operators can focus on a range of
issues and pose questions to the ship crew to gain insight in the sit-
uation and make an informed judgment about the threat factor
severity. This kind of qualitative, narrative information sharing
helps to create a shared situational awareness, see Luokkala and
Fig. 4. Operational focuses for each Vessel TRIAGE category.
122 J. Nordström et al. / Safety Science 85 (2016) 117–129Virrantaus (2014). Some examples of such questions are listed in
Table 2.
From Table 2, it is seen that the severity of the threat factors is
mainly determined by observable aspects of the situation, which
is aimed to make the assessment as objective as possible.
Nonetheless, the information obtained from the questions and
the severity assessment are judgments. The Vessel TRIAGE
method thus allows the users the flexibility to select the severity
level based on the best information available. It is generally
agreed among the participating stakeholders that caution is to
be a guiding principle in selecting the severity of the materialized
threat factor: in case of doubt, the higher severity category should
be selected.3.4. Vessel TRIAGE form and application process
With the main elements of the Vessel TRIAGE method described
in Sections 3.1–3.3, these can be pulled together to describe how
the method is applied in practice. As a support for practical opera-
tions, a Vessel TRIAGE form has been developed, see Fig. 6. Its use is
described below, distinguishing seven steps.
1. Basic information fields. The recorded information includes basic
facts about the incident/accident, such as the vessel name, ves-
sel type, the number of crew members and the number of pas-
sengers. The date and time is recorded to keep track of when the
Vessel TRIAGE assessment is performed.
Fig. 5. Vessel TRIAGE threat factor matrix.
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whether or not it has materialized. Apart from options ‘‘yes” or
‘‘no”, an additional option ‘‘not known” is included in the form.
This is to account for the fact that in some situations, it may be a
time-consuming task to perform a thorough assessment of the
consequences of an accident and the crew may not know
whether or not the threat factor is relevant. Selecting the ‘‘not
known” option allows the Vessel TRIAGE evaluation to con-
tinue, while simultaneously serving as a reminder that this
threat factor should be considered at a later stage.
3. Severity of the materialized threat factors.
3.1. The information about the situation onboard the vessels is
compared with descriptions of situations of different
severity presented in the threat factor matrix, shown in
Fig. 5. The example questions of Table 2 can be used for
this purpose.
3.2. For each realized threat factor, the appropriate severity
level is selected based on the obtained information. In case
of doubt, the more severe option is selected.
4. Crew capabilities and weather conditions. Apart from threat fac-
tors related to the ship main safety functions as such, as listed
in the threat factor matrix, the overall situational severity level
may be negatively affected by impairment of crew capabilities
(e.g. lack of expertise in emergency management, large number
of crew injured due to accident) or due to adverse weather (e.g.stormy weather). These can e.g. hinder the performance of mea-
sures which would, under more favorable conditions, stabilize
the vessel’s safety status. These factors affect the vessel’s safety
on their own, and not just through the threat factors of the
threat factor matrix, which is why these are assessed
separately.
5. Vessel TRIAGE category. Based on the severity assessment of the
realized threat factors, the overall Vessel TRIAGE category is
determined. The basic rule in this assessment is that the overall
category should be at least as severe as the most severe identi-
fied threat factor. Depending on the case, the user may select a
higher severity level than the most severe identified threat fac-
tor, e.g. when crew capabilities or weather conditions worsen
the vessel’s safety status.
6. Remarks. The form reserves some space to make notes about the
threat factors, crew capabilities and weather conditions. These
can be some key issues obtained from the information gather-
ing process (item 3.1).
7. Repeat evaluation. The Vessel TRIAGE category may (and typi-
cally does) change over time as the situation evolves and the
assessment may be repeated to reassess and possibly re-
categorize the vessel in one of the four categories, using a
new form. As a rule of thumb, in less critical situations, the fre-
quency of updating the assessment form can be longer than in
more critical situations.
Table 2
Example questions to elicit information serving as a basis for assessing the severity level of the threat factors shown in the threat factor matrix (Fig. 5).
Threat factor Example questions to obtain insight in the severity level of the threat factor
Flooding  What is the immediate cause of flooding?
 What is the extent of flooding? How many compartments are affected?
 What is the location of flooding?
 Can the flooding be kept under control? Are control measures still available?
 What measures have been taken to control the situation? Are these successful?
 To what extent do the prevailing environmental circumstances influence the severity of the situation?
 What assistance is required by the vessel? How urgent is it?
Listing/decrease of stability  What is the immediate cause of listing?
 How large is the list? Is the list angle increasing?
 To what extent does the list affect other activities on the vessel?
 What measures have been taken to control the situation? Are these successful?
 To what extent do the prevailing environmental circumstances influence the severity of the situation?
 What assistance is required by the vessel? How urgent is it?
Decreased maneuverability  Has the malfunction been caused by an internal or external cause?
 Are the propulsion system, rudder and steering propellers of the vessel functioning normally?
 Has a suitable steering method been correctly selected and is it usable?
 Is the vessel using its backup steering system? If so, how does this limit operations?
 Can the malfunction be repaired using the vessel’s own resources?
 What measures have been taken to control the situation? Are these successful?
 To what extent do the prevailing environmental circumstances influence the severity of the situation?
 What assistance is required by the vessel? How urgent is it?
Black-out  What is the reason for the malfunction?
 What is the extent of the black-out? Does it affect only certain sections/systems or the entire vessel? Are the critical systems
operational?
 Has the emergency generator been switched on in the network?
 If the vessel is running on backup power, how long can it continue to operate?
 Can the malfunction be repaired using the vessel’s own resources?
 What measures have been taken to control the situation? Are these successful?
 To what extent do the prevailing environmental circumstances influence the severity of the situation?
 What assistance is required by the vessel? How urgent is it?
Fire/explosion  What is on fire? What has exploded?
 Where is the fire? Where has the explosion occurred?
 How extensive is the fire? How extensive are the damages?
 Is the smoke toxic? Are hazardous substances involved? What amount? What is their nature?
 How does the fire behave? Has it spread beyond the section where it initialized?
 To what extent does the fire affect other activities on the vessel?
 What measures have been taken to control the situation? Are these successful?
 To what extent do the prevailing environmental circumstances influence the severity of the situation?
 What assistance is required by the vessel? How urgent is it?
Danger posed by hazardous
substances
 In which section of the vessel are the hazardous substances released?
 Have the released substances been identified? What are they? In what form? What are their hazardous characteristics? Is there a
possibility of a chain reaction?
 How much of these substances are on board? Can these be removed from the vessel?
 To what extent does the released substances affect other activities on the vessel?
 What measures have been taken to control the situation? Are these successful?
 To what extent do the prevailing environmental circumstances influence the severity of the situation?
 What assistance is required by the vessel? How urgent is it?
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4.1. Method evaluation process
As described in Section 2, the Vessel TRIAGE method is the
result of co-operative efforts of a wide range of stakeholders. Thus,
the engagement of various potential user groups and stakeholders
with relevant expertise has resulted in a shared understanding of
what the method should do, how it should do this and what is
needed for the method to do so. The method is based primarily
on the judgments of the experts participating in the method devel-
opment, to ensure that a simple and practical tool with the right
level of information for maritime distress situations is developed
(Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 1999; Klein, 1995; Shanteau, 1992a,
1992b).
The evaluation of expert-based methods is a process in which
a reasoned argument is put forward that it can be used as
intended (Barlas and Carpenter, 1990; Goerlandt, 2015; Hodges
and Dewar, 1992). It is a conversational process, which focuses
on three main issues: the design of the method itself, the methodin relation to its use, and remaining uncertainties. This is illus-
trated in Fig. 7.
The first evaluation category concerns whether the method in
itself is a good representation of the considered problem. This is
considered through an introspective and sequential scrutiny of
various features of the method, in particular content, structure, dis-
cretization, parameterization and behavior. The content category
considers whether the method includes the relevant factors to
describe the problem, while structure concerns whether these fac-
tors are combined in a meaningful way. The discretization
addresses the question whether factors included in the method
are split in meaningful categories, while parameterization concerns
whether the right category is assigned for a specific case. Finally,
behavior addresses whether the rules based on which certain cate-
gories are selected are appropriate. These generic evaluation cate-
gories have been proposed and applied in e.g. systems dynamics
modeling (Forrester and Senge, 1980), operations research and
simulation modeling (Eckerd et al., 2011), Bayesian Network mod-
eling (Pitchforth and Mengersen, 2013) and risk analysis
(Goerlandt, 2015).
The second evaluation category concerns whether the method
is indeed useful in its intended context. This is considered by spec-
Fig. 6. Vessel TRIAGE assessment form.
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method scores on these. For instance, if the method aims at
improving communication, it can be studied if it actually helps to
this effect (Hodges and Dewar, 1992).
The third evaluation category concerns uncertainties. Where
uncertainties remain about the adequacy of the method to perform
as intended, such uncertainties need to be made explicit (Douglas,
2009). The first two evaluation categories can, apart from provid-
ing arguments in favor of the method, also reveal possible weak-
nesses of the method, and issues which would benefit from
further study. Such an uncertainty assessment can be a qualitative,
descriptive enumeration of issues to consider when deciding on
whether to implement the system in practice.4.2. Vessel TRIAGE evaluation questionnaire
For evaluating the Vessel TRIAGE method, a questionnaire was
developed which covers the first two evaluation categories
described in Section 4.1. The questionnaire was made using an
online tool and sent to stakeholders. With the questionnaire, a
brief outline of the method was included, describing its main fea-
tures as described in Section 3. In particular, the Vessel TRIAGE cat-
egories and operational focuses (Figs. 3 and 4), the threat factor
matrix (Fig. 5) and the application form (Fig. 6) were presented
to the participants. Apart from the questions concerning the
method, some basic information about the participants, such as
country and organization of employment, age and sex were
Fig. 7. Schematic overview of the elements of the evaluation process, adapted from
Goerlandt (2015).
Table 3
Questions in the Vessel TRIAGE evaluation questionnaire.
# Cluster Vessel TRIAGE evaluation questions
1 S The Vessel TRIAGE method on the whole is an appropriate tool
to categorize the safety status of a vessel in maritime accidents
and distress situations
2 C, D The number of categories of the Vessel TRIAGE method (green,
yellow, red, black) is adequate
3 C, D The interpretation of the Vessel TRIAGE categories
appropriately distinguishes situations representing a different
ship safety level (Fig. 3)
4 C, D The interpretation of the Vessel TRIAGE categories
appropriately distinguishes situations representing a different
operational focus (Fig. 4)
5 C The threat factors (flooding, listing | decrease of stability,
decrease of maneuverability, black-out, fire | explosion, danger
posed by hazardous substances) are adequate to globally
determine the vessel safety status
6 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘flooding” are adequate to
appropriately distinguish situations representing a different
ship safety level (Figs. 3 and 5)
7 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘flooding” are adequate to
appropriately distinguish situations representing a different
operational focus (Figs. 4 and 5)
8 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘listing | decrease of
stability” are adequate to appropriately distinguish situations
representing a different ship safety level (Figs. 3 and 5)
9 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘listing | decrease of
stability” are adequate to appropriately distinguish situations
representing a different operational focus (Figs. 4 and 5)
10 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘decrease ofmaneuverability”
are adequate to appropriately distinguish situations
representing a different ship safety level (Figs. 3 and 5)
11 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘decrease of
maneuverability” are adequate to appropriately distinguish
situations representing a different operational focus (Figs. 4
and 5)
12 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘black-out” are adequate to
appropriately distinguish situations representing a different
ship safety level (Figs. 3 and 5)
13 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘black-out” are adequate to
appropriately distinguish situations representing a different
operational focus (Figs. 4 and 5)
14 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘fire | explosion” are
adequate to appropriately distinguish situations representing
a different ship safety level (Figs. 3 and 5)
15 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘fire | explosion” are
adequate to appropriately distinguish situations representing
a different operational focus (Figs. 4 and 5)
16 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘danger posed by hazardous
substances” are adequate to appropriately distinguish situations
representing a different ship safety level (Figs. 3 and 5)
17 C, D The categories of the threat factor ‘‘danger posed by hazardous
substances” are adequate to appropriately distinguish
situations representing a different operational focus (Figs. 4
and 5)
18 B The basic rule for assigning the overall Vessel TRIAGE category
based on the severity assigned to the realized threat factors
(i.e. the maximum severity level is taken as the overall
category) is adequate
19 C, B The rationale of the modification (increase) of the overall
Vessel TRIAGE category based on the crew functionality or the
influence of weather conditions is adequate
20 U The Vessel TRIAGE method is easy to use during operations
21 U The Vessel TRIAGE method does not take too long to apply in
an operational setting
22 U The Vessel TRIAGE method improves communication in
operational settings
Notes: C = content | S = structure | D = discretization | P = parameterization | B =
behavior | U = use, clusters as described in Section 4.1 and Fig. 7.
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fication among the different evaluation clusters.
Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement with
the 22 statements on a five-level scale, ranging from ‘‘Strongly dis-
agree” (1) over ‘‘Neither agree nor disagree” (3) to ‘‘Strongly agree”
(5). An option was also given to opt out from the question by mark-
ing ‘‘No basis for judgment”. Finally, the option was given to provide
free-text comments where respondents could freely comment on
the method.
Comparing the questionnaire design of Table 3 with the theo-
retical aspects of method evaluation processes described in Sec-
tion 4.1 and Fig. 7, it is seen that no questions are asked about
the parameterization. Such questions would focus on the question
whether, in a given situation, the correct Vessel TRIAGE category
would be selected. Such questions would be difficult to ask in a
questionnaire, as it would require the inclusion of a case study
based on which the category would be selected. Furthermore, a
cross-check of selecting ‘‘the correct category” is troublesome,
because it would require participants to evaluate one another’s
responses. Therefore, the parameterization is left for further study,
e.g. through tests in SAR exercises, where it can be assessed
whether participants agree on the selected category.
4.3. Evaluation results
The questionnaire has been responded by in total 25 partici-
pants. This is a relatively low number, which means the results
should be considered as indicative of the method’s performance.
Table 4 shows a breakdown of the background of the participants.
It is seen that multiple stakeholders in maritime distress situations
are represented, from various countries of employment. Finnish
participants constitute the largest group, and the majority of
respondents were male. The 51–60 years age group is the largest,
with younger participants represented as well.
Fig. 8 shows the results of the evaluation questionnaire. It is
seen that the response is in general very positive, with a similar
response profile for all questions. Referring to Table 3, these results
indicate that the structure (question 1), content (questions 2–17
and 19), discretization (questions 2–4 and 6–17), behavior (ques-
tions 18 and 19) and use criteria (questions 20–22) receive strong
agreement of over half of the participants in the survey. For allthese categories, the second-most chosen response is the still very
favorable ‘‘Somewhat agree” (4) option. However, there is also one
response suggesting strong disagreement with the method.
For the questions related to the method use (questions 20–22),
it is seen that some respondents found they did not have a suffi-
ciently strong basis for making the judgment. This may correspond
Table 4
Overview of background of questionnaire participants.
Organization
Maritime SAR 7
Maritime authority 3
Maritime shipping 3
Classification society 1
Salvage company 1
Volunteer/other rescue 4
University/research institute 3
Other 3
Sex
Male 21
Female 4
Age group
21–30 2
31–40 5
41–50 8
51–60 10
Country of employment
Belgium 2
Brazil 1
Canada 1
Cyprus 1
Denmark 1
Finland 11
Iran 1
Latvia 1
Morocco 1
Russian Federation 1
The Netherlands 2
United States of America 1
J. Nordström et al. / Safety Science 85 (2016) 117–129 127to the fact that the questionnaire asked participants only about
how they would expect the method to perform in practice, i.e.
without actually having tested it. As with the note on parameteri-
zation in Section 4.2, the actual use of the Vessel TRIAGE method
should be tested in SAR exercises and in actual maritime distress
situations.
Only a few free-text comments were given by the respondents.
These mainly provided positive feedback (e.g. ‘‘Very nice method”,
‘‘It is very good to have such a system for assessing vessels”, ‘‘Ves-
sel TRIAGE is a good system to categorize ships in distress”, ‘‘An
excellent way to improve SAR”). Some concerns were also vented,
mainly related to the practical use (e.g. ‘‘I’m not sure that this
[method] would be appropriately used by different parties” andFig. 8. Results of the Vessel TRIAGE que‘‘This seems to add another checklist to the already heavy burden
to the Coast guard operator whose main duty should be to save life
at sea as efficiently as possible”).
In other words, these comments suggest that participants have
a positive attitude towards the evaluation category focusing on the
method per se (category 1 of Section 4.1). However, attitudes are
somewhat more mixed concerning the evaluation category related
to the method’s use (category 2 of Section 4.2). This is in line with
the above mentioned need for testing and evaluating the method
in practical settings, about which some uncertainty currently
remains (category 3 of Section 4.1).5. Discussion
While the evaluation results for the Vessel TRIAGE method indi-
cate a broad agreement among various stakeholder groups, further
studies on its theoretical validity and its practical use are recom-
mended for future research. Especially evaluations in SAR exercises
and analysis of feedback from actual use in maritime distress situ-
ations, accounting for the perspectives of the various actors, would
be valuable for further establishing credibility of the method, or for
making adjustments to the proposed system. In this context, it
should be noted that the validity of medical triage systems is an
ongoing research area, even for well-established triage systems
such as the Manchester Triage system (Parenti et al., 2014; van
der Wulp, 2010). Future research concerning the method could
also address the crew’s willingness to use the method in actual dis-
tress situations given other concerns (e.g. financial losses due to
possible reputational damage after reporting a maritime incident)
and strategies to train ship crew and SAR operators to use the
method.
Notwithstanding the desirability of more practical feedback
about the method in exercises or actual maritime distress situa-
tions, the method already has implications to organizational prac-
tice and has led to further technological developments. First,
Finnish maritime SAR organizations and shipping companies are
currently planning to perform simulator exercises to test the Ves-
sel TRIAGE method in practical settings. Steps are taken to imple-
ment the method in SAR responders’, shipboard and shipping
company emergency response procedures. Second, Finnish mar-
itime authorities are taking steps to propose the method to be
included in the IAMSAR manual through international legislativestionnaire, questions from Table 3.
Fig. 9. Visual presentation of the survivability assessment for a flooded passenger ship: Vessel TRIAGE category, time-domain heel angle prediction and flooding extent
(Pennanen et al., 2015).
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Maritime Organization.
Finally, the four-level rationale of the categorization system has
been implemented as an output of a decision support system for
ship flooding of passenger vessels, see Ruponen et al. (2015), show-
ing that the method is compatible with engineering-based techno-
logical decision support systems. This software system uses the
data from the flood level sensors and status of doors to detect
the breaches in the hull. The progress of floodwater is calculated
in time-domain with flooding simulation, Ruponen et al. (2007).
Based on this prediction, the stability and survivability of the peo-
ple onboard is estimated. The system handles the threat factors
flooding and listing/decrease of stability. The categorization is in
line with the Vessel TRIAGE method (Figs. 3 and 5). The threshold
values for determining the color coding are based on IMO regula-
tions. More details and background on this are given by Ruponen
et al. (2015). The system constantly updates the time prediction
based on latest available data. After each prediction also the Vessel
TRIAGE category is re-evaluated and presented to the user, see
Fig. 9. The advantage of the time-domain approach is that also
evacuation time can be taken into account. For example, the color
code will be red if the estimated time for orderly evacuation and
abandonment is shorter than the predicted time-to-capsize. In this
context, the capsize limit is the maximum heel angle where the
lifeboats can be lowered. The compatibility of such a
computations-based decision support system with the Vessel
TRIAGE method is considered important in the context of further
technological developments in integrated decision support sys-
tems for emergency response, as it can link quantitative calcula-
tions on specific accident types with qualitative knowledge in an
ongoing situation, as recommended by relevant resolutions (IMO,
1995).6. Conclusions
This paper has introduced the Vessel TRIAGE method, which
offers a novel way to assess and communicate the safety level ofvessels in a maritime distress situation, addressing a need voiced
by especially SAR operators. The method is developed in close
cooperation with various stakeholders, and is used to categorize
the situation in one of four Vessel TRIAGE safety levels. These have
implications to operational focuses by the involved actors. A cen-
tral element is a threat factor matrix, which is used alongside a
set of questions to determine the safety level, accounting for con-
textual factors such as crew capabilities and weather conditions. A
form for using the method in practice has also been developed.
The results of a survey among various stakeholders in maritime
SAR indicate that the method in itself is a good tool to categorize
the vessel’s safety level. Notwithstanding some negative feedback,
the method is very positively received by the survey respondents.
Some concerns about the practical use of the method suggest that
one area of further study should be to test the method in SAR exer-
cises and ultimately in actual maritime distress situations. Never-
theless, the Vessel TRIAGEmethod is already being implemented in
Finnish SAR organizations and several Finnish shipping companies’
emergency procedures, and has led to technological developments
in operational survivability decision support systems.
A key advantage of the Vessel TRIAGE method is that it has been
developed in close cooperation between multiple stakeholders.
This way, the method is kept as simple as possible, while condens-
ing knowledge from diverse sectors and organizations. The authors
believe this is an important reason why the evaluation results are
so positive across the range of evaluation criteria.Acknowledgements
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